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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOYCE KNOWLDEN, 
Appellee, 
V S . "oo Mr* C , -a 
GRANT R. KNOWLDEN, : 
Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This an appeal from a final Judgment and Order made and 
Tooele, State Honorable William Thome, Judge, 
presiding. 
The hull jiiit'ii I lieini) d i iii.il iiiul I IIPM> I or c rippen I HI> I <• Older, 
this Court has jurisdiction for the purpose of this appeal pursuant 
to § 78-2a 3(2)(i) of the Judicial Code. Utah Code Ann ^ J J O as 
amended). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Defendant/Appellant, (hereinafter defendant) charges: 
1. that the Court abused its discretion in its division of 
the marital properties; and 
a. it failed to properly credit defendant for his 
identifiable pre-marital contributions to the marital properties; 
b. it erroneously imputed income to defendant resulting 
in an inequitable alimony obligation. 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Regarding findings of fact, the reviewing court views the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most 
supportive of the trial court's findings and will alter the trial 
court's findings only if clearly erroneous. Baker v. Baker 226 Ut. 
Adv. Rep. 27, 28. (Utah, 1993) To prevail on appeal, defendant 
must marshal the evidence that supports the findings and then 
demonstrate that, despite such evidence, the findings are "so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous." Baker at 28, quoting 
Crouse v. Crouse 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Ut. App. 1991) (citations 
omitted); accord Watson. 837 P.2d at 6. 
2. The reviewing court will alter the trial court's property 
division "only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of 
the law resulting in a substantial and prejudicial error, the 
evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a 
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serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion." Baker at 28 (quoting Watson v. Watson 837 P.2d 1, 5 
(Ut. App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter was tried to the Court, pursuant to Plaintiff's 
Petition for Divorce, on January 20, 1994. Plaintiff was granted 
a divorce. The marital property was divided pursuant to 
stipulation and evidence. Judgment was entered on the Divorce 
action on March 8, 1994. 
Defendant moved for a new trial, or in the alternative, for an 
Amendment to the Decree of Divorce pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which was denied on May 3, 1994. The final 
order was signed by the Court on May 17, 1994. 
New counsel for defendant/appellant obtained an extension of 
time from the Court within which to file a Notice of Appeal, which 
was filed on June 23, 1994. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married in 1978. (T.6) Defendant retired 
seven years after the marriage, after having worked at Kennecott 
for twenty-five years. (T. 223) Plaintiff was a homemaker. 
Plaintiff filed for Divorce in 1993. The issues at trial centered 
around the value and division of the marital estate. 
In 1956, defendant purchased a 19.6 acre lot in Grantsville, 
Utah, for $2,500.00. The parties final marital residence would 
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eventually be built on part of that lot, (hereinafter, the 
Grantsville property). (T. 225) Defendant also contributed 
$18,000.00 towards the initial construction of the residence, 
mostly from funds he had accumulated before the marriage. (T. 226) 
At trial, defendant presented evidence that the property had 
a current market value of $86,000.00 That figure included a value 
for the lot of $9,500.00. (T. 147) The property was awarded to 
defendant. 
Defendant had purchased property in Kearns, Utah (hereinafter, 
the Kearns property) five years before the marriage. He paid the 
down payment. This property was initially used as the marital 
residence. It was put into joint tenancy after the marriage. It 
later provided rental income during the marriage. (T. 229) 
Plaintiff was awarded this property. 
Defendant had purchased property on Louise Avenue in Salt Lake 
City (hereinafter, the Louise property) two years before the 
marriage. Defendant made a $4,000.00 down payment and paid the 
monthly mortgage payments. (T. 232) This property provided rental 
income during the marriage. Plaintiff's name was never put on the 
title. Plaintiff was awarded this property. Defendant was 
responsible to satisfy the second mortgage on it, which was taken 
to improve the Grantsville property. 
In 1993, defendant purchased a quilting machine with proceeds 
received from the sale of property that he owned prior to the 
marriage. (T. 233) Plaintiff had been quilting on the machine to 
earn extra money. (T. 135) Defendant was awarded the machine, then 
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the Court imputed the average monthly income that plaintiff had 
been deriving from use of the machine to defendant's income. It 
found defendant's income to be $1,500.00 per month, which included 
$300.00 per month as income from the quilting machine. The Court 
awarded plaintiff $400.00 per month in permanent alimony. (T. 295) 
The Court valued the marital estate at $162,107.00, and based 
its division on that figure. (T. 291) 
The Court ordered defendant to pay certain debts. Plaintiff 
was awarded the liquid assets. (T. 292-6) 
The trial court had before it an amended complaint for 
divorce. Plaintiff's initial complaint had been assigned to Judge 
Pat Brian, who had also made findings and entered certain orders 
regarding the matter. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues the Court did not divide the marital estate 
equitably. Specifically, defendant argues he should have received 
credit for the appreciated value of the land that was associated 
with the Grantsville property. Defendant was equitably entitled to 
at least an $8,000.00 credit against the value of that property. 
Defendant argues he also should have received credit for the 
$18,000.00 cash contribution that he made toward the initial 
construction of the residence on the property. 
Next, defendant argues he should have been awarded the Louise 
property, as plaintiff's contributions to that property were fairly 
reflected in her share of the equity. Alternatively, defendant 
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argues he should have, at the very least, received credit for his 
pre-marital down payment on that property. 
Defendant argues the Court erroneously ordered him to pay 
debts associated with the Kearns property that the court had 
previously ordered plaintiff to pay, pursuant to a pre-trial order. 
Defendant argues the Marcus Knowlden note and the quilting 
machine should have both been either included or excluded from the 
estate. 
Defendant also argues the Court erroneously imputed $300.00 
per month in income to his monthly total, based on his being 
awarded the quilting machine. The Court then used this inflated 
figure to determine defendant's alimony obligation. 
ARGUMENT 
DIVISION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE 
Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in dividing 
up the marital estate and committed clear error in determining the 
value of the estate. It failed to properly credit defendant for 
his identifiable pre-marital contributions to the estate. 
In dividing up the marital estate, the over-riding 
consideration is that the division be equitable, that the property 
be fairly divided between the parties given their contributions 
during the marriage, and the circumstances at the time of the 
divorce. Newmeyer v. Newmever 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987). 
In a divorce proceeding, there is no fixed formula from which 
to determine the division of property. Baker v. Baker 226 Ut. Adv. 
6 
Rep. 27, 28 (Utah App. 1993). 
The trial court sought to equalize the division of the estate. 
The court found the marital estate, less debts, to be valued at 
$162,107.00. (T. 291) (Findings of Fact, para. 15) This included 
a finding that the Grantsville property had a current fair market 
value of $86,000.00. (T. 291) (Findings of Fact, para. 6, 15) The 
appraiser, Mr. Alsop, testified that the $86,000.00 figure included 
a determination that the value of the lot was $9,500.00. (T. 147) 
Defendant contends that at least eight thousand dollars ($8,000.00) 
of the $9,500.00 value of the lot should have been deducted from 
the value of the property because he had originally purchased the 
lot long before the marriage and was entitled to credit for any 
appreciation of the value of the lot. The lot was originally more 
than nineteen (19.6) unimproved acres. (T. 225) The marital 
residence and appurtenance was built on three acres. (See Order on 
Plaintiff's Motion, dated January 5, 1994, where Judge Brian 
recognized the three acre plot (Addendum A) (para. 3, 4, 5, 7)) A 
correct calculation would have credited defendant with the 
appreciated value of at least 16 unimproved acres. The value of 
the residence and appurtenance and three acres should have been 
used as the value of the marital property, not the entire lot. Mr. 
Alsop placed the current value of each acre at about $500.00. 
(T. 149) The value of the marital property land was $1,500.00. 
Utah case law recognized that identifiable pre-marital assets 
are generally exempt from the marital estate. See Preston v. 
Preston 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982). (Each party should receive pre-
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marital assets)• In Burke v. Burke 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), 
the court noted that pre-marital property, gifts, and inheritance, 
may be viewed as separate property and in appropriate 
circumstances, equity will require that each party retain the 
separate property brought into the marriage (citing Preston at 
706). The court listed some of the factors generally considered: 
the amount and kind of property; whether the property was acquired 
before or during the marriage; and the source of the property. Of 
particular concern is whether one spouse has made any contribution 
toward the growth of the separate assets of the other spouse 
(citing Dubois v. Dubois 504 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1991), and whether the 
assets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the 
parties. In Burke, the court awarded one party his pre-marital 
property and the other party did not get credit for the 
appreciation of that property. 
In Mortensen v. Mortensen 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988), it 
was noted that according to the Supreme Court, trial courts should 
generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and 
inheritance during the marriage, or property acquired in exchange 
thereof, to that spouse, together with any appreciation of 
enhancement of its value, unless: 1) the other spouse has by his or 
her efforts or experience contributed to the enhancement, 
maintenance, or projection of that property, thereby acquiring an 
equitable interest in it, or 2) the property has been consumed or 
its identity lost through commingling or exchange or where the 
acquiring spouse has made a gift or an interest therein to the 
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other spouse. (Also see Willev v. Willev 866 P.2d at 555 (Ut. App. 
1993); Bingham v. Bingham 872 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Ut. App. 1994). 
As noted in Newmever. the appropriate treatment of property 
brought into a marriage by one party may vary from case to case. In 
Newmever. plaintiff's inheritance, acquired during the marriage, 
was properly excluded from valuation of the marital estate (citing 
Jesperson v. Jesperson 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980) (not 
unreasonable for trial court to withdraw from marital property the 
equivalent of assets brought into marriage). 745 P.2d at 1278 (Utah 
1987). 
Here, the court found that defendant paid $2,500.00 for the 
lot in 1956. The lot was, and stayed in defendant's name and 
remained unimproved until the construction on the residence began 
in 1981. (Findings, para. 6) The court adopted defendant's 
evidence regarding the $86,000.00 fair market value of the 
property, which necessarily included the $9,500.00 value for all 
the land. Defendant asked for the full credit but equity would 
dictate that defendant be credited with at least the appreciated 
value of the portion of the lot that remained unimproved. There 
was no evidence presented that plaintiff contributed anything to 
the unimproved land. She did nothing to enhance its value. The 
unimproved land is separable and identifiable and should not merge 
into the marital estate. The house and the three acre plot on 
which it sits is the actual marital property in which plaintiff had 
an interest. Judge Brian had already recognized that. (Addendum 
A, para. 3, 4, 5, 7) 
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Defendant submits the court should have credited him with a 
pre-marital asset worth at least $8,000.00 to reflect the 
appreciation of his original pre-marital investment in the lot. 
The court erred in not deducting that, or any, amount from the 
$86,000.00 figure. It should have calculated the property to be 
valued at no more than $78,000.00. 
Plaintiff suggested the proposed valuation of the property be 
set at $86,813.00 (T. 185), based on a cost approach analysis that 
had the property worth over $96,000.00. (T. 270) Plaintiff 
suggested crediting defendant with $9,500.00 for the lot value and 
deducting it from the higher figure. (T. 185) The court rejected 
plaintiff's cost approach analysis and accepted defendant's fair 
market value figure, but then failed to credit defendant for the 
value of the unimproved lot. 
Regarding the applicable factors listed in Burke (supra) and 
Mortensen. (supra). with respect to the kind of asset in question, 
defendant bought an unimproved lot long before the marriage that 
appreciated through no effort or contribution by the plaintiff. 
The plot of land actually used for the house and yard has its own 
separable value of $1,500.00. That's the only "land" plaintiff had 
any interest in. 
Defendant submits it is inequitable and abuse of discretion 
for the court to have failed to credit him fully for his 
identifiable pre-marital asset, only a small portion of which was 
commingled with the house and yard to make up the marital 
residence. There was no evidence from which to conclude that the 
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entire lot had merged into the marital property. A value had been 
placed on the small, separable part that was commingled. Judge 
Brian's order, by implication, means that defendant was not 
restricted from the 16 acres outside the marital property. This 
means the court did not consider that acreage part of the marital 
estate as far as plaintiff's interests were concerned. 
The trial court wrongfully found that all the defendant's pre-
marital interest and investments were commingled with plaintiff's 
"sweat equity." (T. 291- 2) The court only alluded to giving 
defendant "some credit for original down payments and other things 
on property," (T. 293) (Findings, para. 17), but made no other 
specific finding on the matter. Defendant contends the court erred 
in those findings due to insufficient evidence. The court should 
have identified, separated, and credited defendant for his 
appreciated pre-marital asset, the nature of which (unimproved lot) 
has remained the same throughout. 
Defendant contends that the court erred in finding that his 
other identifiable pre-marital monetary contributions that were 
used to initiate construction of the marital residence had 
commingled with plaintiff's sweat equity, thus losing its separate 
identity. (T. 291-2) (Findings, para. 6) 
In 1981, defendant withdrew $7,000.00 from his sick leave and 
vacation benefits, the vast majority of which he had accumulated 
prior to the marriage, and spent it on the initial construction of 
the marital residence. (T. 83; 228) The parties had been married 
three years when work on the house began. In 1985, when he 
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retired, defendant withdrew $12,000.00 of the $15,000.00 he was 
entitled to from his retirement fund and spent it on the 
construction. (T. 84) Defendant asked the court for credit of 
those pre-marital funds against the value of the property. 
The court heard testimony that the parties worked together to 
build the house. Both parties contributed time and labor. (T. 11; 
81-3) Defendant submits that equity would dictate that the court 
do what was done in Newmever (supra). In Newmeyer (supra) the 
court credited the plaintiff with the identifiable amounts of money 
she had put into the marital home, then awarded the defendant one-
half of the equity of the home. 745 P.2d at 1279. Since both 
parties contributed time and effort, both should be entitled to 
half the equity of the home. But since defendant also contributed 
substantial sums of money, the majority of which were pre-marital 
in nature, separate and identifiable, he was entitled to credit for 
those monetary contributions, apart from the value that the 
parties1 combined efforts entitled them to share. 
The court erred in finding that defendant's monetary 
contributions, as well as his labor and efforts, had merged with 
plaintiff's labor and efforts. The court wrongly found that 
defendant's money had lost its separate identity. If defendant had 
not put those funds toward the house, plaintiff would not otherwise 
have been entitled to benefit from all that money. She may have 
been entitled to half of that which was accumulated by defendant 
during the marriage, less than one-third. The vast majority of 
those funds were clearly pre-marital in origin. The court, based 
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on erroneous findings, abused its discretion in failing to credit 
defendant for his separate pre-marital monetary contribution. 
The court abused its discretion in awarding the Louise 
property to the plaintiff. Alternatively, the court abused its 
discretion in failing to give defendant full credit for his 
identifiable pre-marital monetary contributions to that property. 
This failing caused the court to err in the valuation of the 
property and the estate. 
Defendant purchased the property two years prior to the 
marriage (T.232); (Findings, para 13). He made a $4,000.00 down 
payment and two years of mortgage payments of $129.00 per month. 
The property remained in defendant's name and was a source of 
rental income. (T. 30, 74, 232-3) (Findings, para. 13). In 1991, 
a second mortgage was taken against it to finance improvements on 
the Grantsville property. (T. 233) 
Plaintiff testified she thought the equity in the property 
prior to the second mortgage being taken against it was $7,000.00 -
$8,000.00. (T. 28) 
Defendant testified the property was basically self-
sufficient, that no other marital monies or resources were expended 
in its upkeep, including the two mortgage obligations; and that any 
expenditures incurred were more than set off by the profit realized 
from it, and that it was currently realizing no profit. (T. 74; 
232-3) Plaintiff did not dispute that evidence. (T. 197,8) 
Plaintiff testified that they'd repainted the house, installed some 
new windows, used carpeting, and new kitchen cabinets. (T. 169) 
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Plaintiff did not testify to expending marital funds to do this. 
In fact, plaintiff corroborated the defendant by saying the 
property had produced income before the second mortgage. After 
that, it broke even. (T.197) There was insufficient evidence to 
support the findings that marital money was ever used to pay the 
mortgage or improve the premises. Nevertheless, the court so 
found. (Findings para. 13) The reasonable conclusion from that 
evidence would be that the rental income paid the mortgage and was 
used to purchase materials to improve the premises. Defendant 
testified the rent produced $200.00 per month in income before the 
second mortgage (T. 74) While it is arguable that the rental 
income merged with other marital funds, this situation is still 
distinguishable. Sharing in the proceeds from a property is 
different than sharing the ownership and title to that property. 
Simply because plaintiff shared in the rental income does not 
necessarily entitle her to an 
ownership interest in the source of that income. The court erred 
in its findings, which were based on insufficient evidence. 
Defendant made no gift of this property to plaintiff like he 
did with the Kearns property. The trial court found defendant's 
gift of joint tenancy to plaintiff on the Kearns property an 
important factor. (Findings, para. 12) This property was in a 
different posture. This property cost plaintiff nothing. It cost 
the marriage nothing. It was never a marital residence. 
Plaintiff's contributions to it would have been fairly reflected by 
her receipt of half the equity. (See Newmever supra) Defendant 
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intended to keep this property in the family. He was renting it to 
his son and his family for minimal rent because the family's wages 
were so meager. (T. 252) Under these circumstances, equity 
dictates that defendant should have been awarded the property. 
Plaintiff deserved a one-half interest in the equity, which by her 
own accounting was $4,000.00. The court abused its discretion in 
awarding this property to plaintiff. Its findings were not 
supported by the evidence. 
Alternatively, if awarding the property to plaintiff was 
equitable, then the court abused its discretion in not crediting 
defendant for his identifiable pre-marital monetary contribution to 
the property. Equity should dictate that, since no separate 
marital funds were used to maintain the property, and since both 
parties enjoyed any income from it and both contributed "sweat 
equity" through time and effort toward it, defendant's additional 
contribution of $7,000.00 ($4,000.00 down payment and $3,000.00 in 
payments) of his pre-marital monies should have first been deducted 
from the value of the property. Because defendant lost the 
property, and the property continues to increase in value and 
generate income for plaintiff, equity should require that defendant 
at least get his pre-marital money back. Those funds are separable 
and identifiable. (Newmever. supra) The court erred in finding 
those funds just blended into the marital estate. (Findings, para. 
13) No separate marital funds went into that property. The 
findings were not supported by the evidence. 
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The court found the Louise property value to be $30,000.00. 
Defendant was ordered to pay the $8,245.00 second mortgage 
obligation. (T. 293) Had defendant received his proper credit for 
his pre-marital contributions, the property should have been valued 
at $23,000.00. At the very least, defendant should have gotten 
full credit for his down payment. 
The court also ordered defendant to pay the same property 
taxes and fire insurance on the Kearns property (Findings, para. 
16) that Judge Brian had previously ordered plaintiff to pay when 
he gave her the benefit of the Kearns rental income. (See Order, 
para. 3) (Addendum B) Plaintiff did not pay them. (T. 185) Her 
counsel incorrectly argued that there was no order in place 
regarding those obligations. (T. 315) The court found that 
plaintiff was still receiving the Kearns rental income. (T. 308) 
There was no explanation given for this contrary order. Judge 
Brian issued a valid order that plaintiff did not comply with. 
Just because it was a pre-trial order did nothing to diminish its 
validity. The court erred in transferring that obligation to 
defendant without any findings to support it, and with no finding 
that Judge Brian's order was somehow invalid or plaintiff's 
contempt excusable. Plaintiff received a windfall from her non-
compliance. Those amounts should be deducted from the defendant's 
debt obligation. 
The court erred in including the value of the Marcus Knowlden 
note as part of the marital estate, or alternatively, in failing to 
16 
credit defendant with the value of the quilting machine against the 
value of the estate. 
Shortly after the marriage, defendant sold some property that 
he had owned prior to the marriage. He sold it to Marcus Knowlden 
for $30,000.00. He took a $20,000.00 mortgage and assigned 
plaintiff a $10,000.00 promissory note. (T. 243) 
Mr. Knowlden paid off the mortgage with a lump sum payment a 
month before plaintiff filed for divorce. (T. 243) Defendant used 
that money to purchase the quilting machine. 
The court awarded defendant the quilting machine in spite of 
finding that plaintiff was actually using it to make quilts. 
(Findings, para. 19) Apparently, the court did not consider the 
machine a marital asset due to its pre-marital sources. Since the 
court presumably found the machine was a pre-marital asset and 
excludable from the estate, it should follow that plaintiff's note, 
also of pre-marital origin, should have been excluded from the 
estate. It was plaintiff's gift all along. 
The evidence showed that plaintiff was receiving the monthly 
payment on the note. (T. 182) Indeed, it was listed as a source 
of income for plaintiff. 
Alternatively, if the note was properly included in the 
estate, then defendant's machine should have been included. 
In other words, the court erred in not crediting each party's 
assets which derived from the same pre-marital source against the 
estate, or it erred in not excluding both from the value of the 
estate. 
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Had defendant been properly credited for all his identifiable, 
separable pre-marital monetary contributions, the value of the 
marital estate would have been less than that which the court 
found. The distribution would have been more equitable, with 
plaintiff still having received no less than she properly, 
equitable deserved, but certainly no more, as was the result here 
due to the court's errors. 
ALIMONY 
The Court abused its discretion in imputing income to 
Defendant and erred in determining his Alimony obligation. 
Generally, alimony is to be awarded after consideration of 
three factors: a) the receiving spouse's financial condition and 
needs; b) the receiving spouse's ability to earn adequate income; 
c) the providing spouse's ability to provide support. Newmever v. 
Newmever 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 1987). 
Failure to consider these factors constitutes abuse of 
discretion. Hill v. Hill 869 P.2d 963, 966 (Utah App., 1994) 
The trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings on 
each factor to enable the reviewing court to ensure the trial 
court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon 
[those] factors. Willev v. Willev 866 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah App. 
1993). 
Defendant contends the court failed to adequately consider his 
ability to provide that much support. The court correctly 
calculated defendant's monthly income to be $1,200.00. (T. 295) 
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It then imputed an additional $300.00 per month to his monthly 
income because he was being awarded the quilting machine. (T. 295) 
The $300.00 per month represented plaintiff's earning ability from 
her use of the machine. (T. 296) 
The court awarded the quilting machine to defendant. Evidence 
was presented that defendant had purchased the machine in March, 
1993, with money that he derived from the sale of a pre-marital 
asset. (T. 243) 
Plaintiff had testified that she was a skilled quilt maker. 
(T. 155) She had her own equipment (a quilting serger and an 
electronic Bernina sewing machine), which she used to sew the 
fabric together before quilting it on the quilting machine. She 
testified that her average monthly income from making quilts was 
$300.00, although some months she earned "hardly anything." (T.157) 
Defendant had never quilted, nor ever used the quilting 
machine. There was no evidence that he could even sew. He asked 
that he be awarded the machine because he felt it was his since he 
bought it with pre-marital funds. When asked if he intended to use 
the quilting machine, he responded that "...it looks like I'm going 
to have to have income from some source." (T.244) 
In its findings, the court concluded that defendant 
"...has the ability to earn an additional $300.00 by 
virtue of the fact that he is being awarded the quilting 
machine, which he requested, and which should be awarded 
to him. Plaintiff testified that she could earn $300.00 
per month from the use of that machine and has been 
earning that sum... . The plaintiff will no longer have 
that money available to her, but defendant Knowlden 
should have that money available to him to add to his 
monthly net income." 
(see Findings of Fact, para. 19) 
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The court went on to find that it ".•.questions whether defendant 
Knowlden will in fact make use of the quilting machine... ." 
(T. 296); (Findings, para. 19) 
At the hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial, as 
defendant's trial counsel argued the error of that ruling, the 
court responded that: 
"I seem to remember Mr. Knowlden indicating that he would make 
the same, same income from it." (T. 306) 
Defendant contends the court abused its discretion by imputing 
$300.00 more to his monthly income, bringing his total to $1,500.00 
per month. The court then calculated the disparity in the parties' 
incomes using the $1,500.00 figure, and awarded plaintiff $400.00 
per month in permanent alimony. (T. 296); (Findings, para. 19) 
In Willey v. Willey, supra, defendant claimed the trial court 
improperly imputed his income in setting the alimony award. 
Defendant argued that the court's findings were based solely upon 
speculation. The appellate court agreed and found abuse of 
discretion. The appellate court stated that the trial court has 
authority to impute income to defendant; however, it cannot be 
premised on conjecture; instead, it demands a careful and precise 
assessment requiring detailed findings. 886 P.2d at 544. 
Defendant contends the court engaged in speculation and 
conjecture in determining that he had the requisite skill and 
ability to equal plaintiff's income from quilting. There was no 
evidence, nor any findings, that defendant had or could reasonably 
acquire any skill or experience in quilting. Secondly, he did not 
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have the other machines needed, nor the required skill for 
preparing the material for the quilting machine. There was no 
evidence, nor any findings, that he could even use any of the 
machines. There was no evidence, nor any findings, that he had a 
source or any contracts or contacts for selling his quilts. There 
was no basis for the court's apparent assumption that defendant's 
output and product quality would be the same as plaintiff's had 
been, and that his quilts would command a similar price. The court 
assumed that defendant's purported income from quilting would be 
steady. Plaintiff testified that it was sporadic at best. 
There exists no rational basis, in fact, to conclude that 
defendant could earn even one penny making quilts, much less 
$300.00 per month, every month. It's not simply a matter of 
feeding cloth into the machine and having it spit out a quilt. 
Just because plaintiff could use the machine to create a home-made 
product that people would buy does not mean defendant could do so 
as well. Defendant did not say that "he would make the same income 
from it" as the court seemed to remember. Defendant never stated 
he could use the machine to earn anything. His response was 
ambiguous at best. 
The court did not engage in a careful and precise assessment 
of defendant's ability to provide that support, nor were its 
findings detailed to reflect such an assessment. It speculated 
that defendant could match plaintiff's skill and ability to quilt 
and earn the same amount of money. Unfortunately, the court could 
not award defendant the requisite skill and ability. The machine 
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is, in fact, useless to defendant and he can realize no monthly 
income from it. 
The court abused its discretion in this matter. It should 
have used the $1,200.00 figure in determining defendant's real 
income. Presumably, the disparity in incomes would not have been 
as great, and the alimony award should have been reduced or 
eliminated accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, defendant prays that this Court 
reverse the findings of the trial court and remand the matter back 
to that court to amend the distribution of property to reflect the 
proper credits due the defendant. Defendant prays the alimony 
award be reduced or eliminated. 
DATED this 23 day of /Ld&<**J^~~~ 1994. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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ATTACHMENTS 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOYCE KNOWLDEN, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRANT R. KNOWLDEN, and Civil No. 934300096 
GRACE POLOSKEY, 
Defendants. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for trial 
before the above-entitled court on January 20, 1994, at the hour of 
9:00 a.m., the Honorable William A. Thorne, Third District Court 
Judge, presiding, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and being 
represented by counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and the Defendant, 
Grant R. Knowlden, being present in person and being represented by 
counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, and the Defendant, Grace Poloskey, being 
present in person and being represented by counsel, J. Duke 
Edwards, and the parties having been sworn and having testified and 
having presented exhibits and evidence, and the court having 
reviewed the Plaintiff's memorandum and'heard the arguments of 
counsel, and based thereon, the court now makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff is now and has been for a period or more 
months immediately prior to the filing of the complaint in this 
action a resident of Tooele County, State of Utah. 
2. That the parties Joyce Knowlden and Grant R. Knowlden are 
husband and wife, having been married on September 10, 1978, in 
Elko County, Nevada. 
3. That the Defendant, Grace Poloskey is a resident of 
Tooele County, State of Utah, and the sister of the Defendant, 
Grant R. Knowlden. 
4. That irreconcilable differences have arisen between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant Knowlden which make continuation of the 
marriage impossible. 
5. That Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden have had no 
children born as issue of this marriage and none are expected. 
6. Real property located at 6000 North Old Lincoln Highway, 
Grantsville, Utah, was acquired by Defendant Knowlden prior to the 
marriage. Defendant Knowlden paid $2,500.00 for the land in, 
approximately, 1956, and the land remained undeveloped until the 
parties commenced building upon the property. Plaintiff and 
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Defendant Knowlden commenced building on tlie property and improving 
the property on or about 1981, and by their labor and "sweat 
equity," built the residence located at that property, which is 
valued at $86,000.00, the current fair market value. The funds of 
money that Defendant Knowlden claims as premarital and which were 
used to assist in the construction of the Grantsville residence 
became co-mingled with marital funds and any monies that may have 
been separate property of Defendant Knowlden lost its separate 
identify because of that co-mingling. Further, the residence was 
constructed with the individual efforts and "sweat equity" of the 
Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden. This Grantsville property was 
enhanced and augmented by the acts of the Plaintiff and its entire 
value became a marital asset. 
7. That on or about May 13, 1991, Defendant Grant R. 
Knowlden transferred the Grantsville property to his sister, 
Defendant Grace Poloskey, for no money consideration. Since that 
time, the Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden have continued to reside 
in the property and treated the property as their own, though the 
property remained in the name of Defendant Knowlden's sister, 
Defendant Poloskey. Defendant Poloskey paid the taxes and 
insurance at various times subsequent to the transfer, but was 
reimbursed those sums by monthly payments made by Defendant 
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located at 6000 North Old Lincoln Highway, Grantsville, Utah, to 
his sister, Defendant Grace Poloskey. 
11. For purposes of dividing the marital estate, the current 
value of the Grantsville property should be used rather than the 
value of the property at the date of its transfer on or about May 
13, 1991, as prayed for by Defendant Knowlden. 
12. The Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden resided together 
subsequent to their marriage at a home located at 4801 South 4900 
West, Kearns, Utah. That property was purchased by Defendant 
Knowlden prior to the marriage, and in, approximately 1973, but 
transferred into the names of Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden 
subsequent to the parties' marriage. The transfer of said property 
into joint tenancy constituted a gift of the premarital property to 
Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden. Further, during the marriage, 
Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden resided at that residence, made 
payments on the mortgage and made improvements on the property, 
including repainting and carpeting. Co-mingling occurred of this 
premarital asset with marital funds. Further there was an 
enhancement of the property by the acts of the Plaintiff. The 
property is a marital asset. The value of that property, at the 
date of trial, is $42,000.00, based upon the appraisal and 
stipulation of the parties. 
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13. Prior to the marriage and in i976, Defendant Knowlden 
purchased a property located at 39 East Louise Avenue, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. That property remained in his name during the 
marriage. During the marriage, the mortgage was paid. Further, 
during the marriage, Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden put siding 
and new carpeting on the property as well as thermal windows and a 
new roof. Further, the marriage, Plaintiff assisted in scraping 
and repainting the property, cleaning the property for the rentals, 
making curtains for the property and managing the property for 
rentals. The property is a marital asset for purposes of assessing 
the marital estate and dividing the same due to the acquisition of 
equity over the period of the marriage and the augmentation and 
enhancement of the property by Plaintiff and the co-mingling of the 
marital funds with the property. The property is valued at 
$30,000.00, pursuant to the evidence presented at trial and the 
testimony of the Plaintiff. 
14. The court finds that the power tools have a value of 
$3,500.00. Plaintiff testified that the power tools and equipment 
were valued at $7,385.00, but that testimony was based an amount 
that was provided to her by another individual which sum she did 
not think was correct and to which she added some things in order 
to come up with that value. Defendant Knowlden valued the tools at 
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approximately $3,500.00 and the court 'finds that value more 
convincing. 
15. The Plaintiff and Defendant's marital assets, less debts, 











Marcus Knowlden note receivable 
Farm equipment 
Liquid accounts at Key Bank Account, 
Zions, Garfield Credit Union, Utah 
Credit Union and the debt from Ms. Eyre $1,224.00 
Power Tools and tools $3,500.00 
The above-referenced values are based upon the testimony of the 
parties, stipulation of the parties, appraisals or other evidence 
adduced at trial. 
a. The Plaintiff should be awarded the Kearns property, 
the Firenza, the Cavalier, the Citation, the Marcus Knowlden note, 
the Key Bank Account, Zions, Garfield Credit Union, Utah Credit 
Union and the debt owed by Ms. Eyre. The total of the marital 
estate thus initially awarded to Plaintiff is valued at $51,975.00. 
16. Defendant Knowlden should be awarded the Grantsville 














equipment and tools and farm equipment. Further, Defendant 
Knowlden should pay the following debts: as set forth on 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, and as follows: Levitz $546.00, Bank One 
$437.00, property taxes (Kearns property $297.00), fire insurance 
(Kearns property 179.00), Utah State taxes $103, and the debt to 
Shellie Eyre $113, which total $1,693.00. 
17. An equal division of the marital estate requires 
Plaintiff to receive, approximately, $81,000.00. To equalize the 
estate, Plaintiff should be awarded the Louise property valued at 
$30,000.00, less the first mortgage. The first mortgage owing to 
Lomas Mortgage should be paid by the Plaintiff and the second 
mortgage owing to Lomas Mortgage should be paid by Defendant 
Knowlden. That division is based upon the representations of 
Defendant Knowlden that the second mortgage is approximately 
$8,245.00, with a monthly payment of $249.72 and that the first 
mortgage is approximately $3,086.00, with a monthly payment of 
$97.00. The total award to Plaintiff of marital property is 
approximately $79,000.00, which is approximately one-half of the 
estate and provides Defendant Knowlden some credit for the original 
down payment made on the Grantsville property. 
18. It is reasonable that the building materials located at 
the Grantsville property be sold and that Defendant Knowlden insure 
that those be sold and that Defendant Knowlden obtain two estimates 
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from two different appraisers as to what'they think the property 
can sell for and sell the building materials to the highest bidder. 
The money received should then be divided equally between the 
parties, one-half to each. 
19. Defendant Grant R. Knowlden is retired and has total net 
income of $1,200.00, which includes social security and his 
Kennecott Retirement income, less the deduction for the survivor 
benefit which he pays each month for the benefit of the Plaintiff. 
In addition, Defendant Knowlden has the ability to earn an 
additional $300.00 by virtue of the fact that he is being awarded 
the quilting machine, which he requested and which should be 
awarded to him. Plaintiff testified that she could earn $300.00 
per month from the use of that machine and has been earning that 
sum during the pendency of this action. The Plaintiff will no 
longer have that money available to her, but Defendant Knowlden 
should have that money available to him to add to his monthly net 
income. The Plaintiff's monthly income is comprised of $120.00 per 
month which she receives from Defendant Knowlden7s son, Marcus 
Knowlden, which is a note receivable owed to her. Further, with 
the award of the Louise property to her, Plaintiff will receive the 
sum of approximately $325.00 per month, for a total net income of 
$445.00 per month. Based upon the respective incomes of the 
parties, it is reasonable that Defendant Knowlden pay Plaintiff 
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permanent alimony in the sum of $400.00 per month. That sum does 
not equalize the parties' income. The court questions whether 
Defendant Knowlden will, in fact, make use of the quilting machine 
and it is anticipated that in the near future, Plaintiff will 
qualify for social security benefits. Four hundred dollars per 
month is reasonable based upon Defendant Knowlden's ability to pay 
and the Plaintiff's needs. The Plaintiff's monthly expenses are 
minimally $879.00 per month, without a mortgage or rent payment. 
The Plaintiff will have $448.00 net per month and the Kearns 
property which will provide her with a place to live, rent free. 
The $400.00 is within Defendant Knowlden's . ability to pay and, 
clearly, the Plaintiff needs that amount in order to survive. 
20. Defendant Grace Poloskey testified that she is holding 
approximately $7,000.00, representing fire insurance proceeds paid 
to her as the title holder to the Grantsville property. The court 
does not have authority to re-claim those assets as Defendant 
Poloskey had a contract with the insurance company and the court 
does not have authority to retrieve those sums. 
21. That the personal property acquired by the parties should 
be divided according to Exhibit 10, attached hereto, designated as 
Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference, expect for the 




KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3 4-> 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, ? , O 
310 South Main Streer 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah S4i01 
Telephone (801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOYCE KNOWLDEN, ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
IN RE: CONTEMPT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRANT R. KNOWLDEN, and Civil No. '934300096 
GRACE POLOSKEY, 
Defendants. Judge Pat B. Brian 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER, having come on regularly for 
hearing before the above entitled court on December 14, 1993, at 
the hour of 11:30 a.m., the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Third District 
Court Judge presiding, on Plaintiff's Motion in Re: Contempt, and 
the Plaintiff being present in person and being represented by 
counsel, Terry R. Spencer for Kellie F. Williams, and the 
Defendant, Grant R. Knowlden, being present and being represented 
by counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, and the court having heard the proffers 






reviswec the i: Les ana pleadings; an-J Lor good cause appear ir.Ci. 
there!oro: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The previously ordered payment of rental income from the 
Kearns rental and previously ordered alimony shall be paid by 
Defendant Grant R. Knowlden to Plaintiff on or before 5:00 p.m. on 
the 10th day of. each month. 
2. The rental income payment and alimony for December 1993 
will be paid by December 15, 1993. 
3. From the date of this order until February 1, 1994, 
defendant Grant R. Knowlden is permitted to enter that portion of 
tjjusi approximately twenty-acre property which contains the marital 
residence (a portion of approximately three acres) for the specific 
purpose of completing or assisting in the completion of a 
firewall." 
4. During each of Defendant's visits to the three-acre 
portion of the property from the date of this order until February 
1, 1994, Defendant is ordered not to in any way enter the living 
quarters of the marital residence. 
5. After February 1, 1994, Defendant is ordered not to enter 
that approximately three-acre portion of property surrounding the 
marital residence for any reason. If the "firewall" is not 
completed by February 1, 1994, Plaintiff is permitted to obtain the 
2 
00020;:* 
i r a n t 
t h i r a p a r c v r e compi.etc t n e 
be r m a n c i a . . . i 7 resp•.: now: a en \H :..-. 
co tnis third party should the services oi a third party De 
obtained. 
6. Defendant is further ordered not to harass or threaten 
Plaintiff in any way, 
~, in addition 1:0 Defendant's access to the approximately 
three acres of property surrounding the marital residence as 
described above, Plaintiff is ordered to permit Defendant access to 
his tools contained in the list provided in Exhibit "A,! to this 
order at 9:00 a.m. on December 27, 1993, 
8. The Tooele County Sheriff's office, or other appropriate 
law enforcement agency, is hereby ordered to assist in the transfer 
of tools at 9:00 a.m. on December 27, 1993. 
DATED this £> ~ day of ^ {$•?<> ~/> *r,-*f£4<&1 
PAT B. BRIAN 
District Court Judge 
iS TO FORM: 
EM!TMITSUNAGA 
Counsel for defer 
Dated: 1^1 >3 
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ADDENDUM B 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




GRANT R. KNOWLDEN, and Civil No. 934300096 
GRACE POLOSKEY, 
Defendants. Judge Pat B. Brian 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER, having come on regularly for 
hearing before the above entitled court on May 11, 1993, at the 
hour of 10:30 a.m., the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Third District 
Court Judge presiding, and the Plaintiff being present in person 
and being represented by counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and the 
Defendant, Grant R. Knowlden, being present in person and being 
represented by counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, and the court having met 
with the parties in chambers, and the parties having reached a 
leement as to the majority of the issues, and the 
court having recommended approval of the same, and entered its own 
ULILlNl o [ j : ! 
order as to some issues, and based thereon and for good cause 
appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff, Joyce Knowlden, shall remain in the temporary 
use and temporary possession of that certain real property known as 
6000 North Old Lincoln Highway, Grantsville, Utah, until further 
order of this court. 
2. The $2,600.00 (Two Thousand Six Hundred Dollar) insurance 
check recently received by the parties shall be endorsed by the 
parties and shall be used to pay the outstanding debts to Sears, 
Dr. Adamson, and Garfield Credit Union. The balance remaining, of 
approximately $300.00 (Three Hundred Dollars) should be paid to 
ISAT on the debt for the therapy provided to Plaintiff. It is 
acknowledged that the debt to Garfield Credit Union is to pay off 
the balance owing on the Plaintiff's vehicle. If the court finds 
bhat there is some unequal benefit to the Plaintiff by payment of 
:hat debt, at the time of trial, then the payment of the debt may 
>e considered in the allocation of assets. 
3. The Defendant is ordered to continue to manage the 
arties' two rental properties known as 4801 South 4900 West, 
earns, Utah, and 39 East Louise Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
ay the mortgages thereon. On a temporary basis, Defendant is 
warded the right to receive the rental proceeds from the Louise 
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Avenue property and pay all taxes and insurance thereon. On a 
temporary basis, the Plaintiff is awarded the right to receive the 
proceeds from the rental property at 4801 South 4900 West, Kearns, 
Utah, subject to her paying the water bill, taxes and insurance 
thereon. 
4. The Defendant is hereby enjoined and restrained from 
coming around the Plaintiff at the marital residence at 6000 North 
Old Lincoln Highway, Grantsville, Utah, or purposely coming in 
contact with the Plaintiff or from telephoning or having any 
contact whatsoever with Plaintiff. Further, Defendant is enjoined 
from harassing, annoying, or physical touching or abusing the 
Plaintiff. 
5. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded the temporary use and 
possession of the personal property at the marital residence, 
including the quilting machine. The Defendant's rights to the 
future use or possession of that machine should not be prejudiced 
by the temporary possession being awarded to Plaintiff. Plaintiff 
shall have the right to receive any and all proceeds from the sale 
of quilts and from the use of that machine. 
6. The Plaintiff is ordered to inventory the personal 
property located at the marital residence and to provide the 
Defendant with a list of that property and a list of those items of 
personal property which she wishes awarded to her. Defendant is 
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